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Recent Developments

Hudson v. United States:

In

Hudson v. United States,
118 S.Ct. 488 (1997), the
United States Supreme Court
held that civil penalties, including
monetary fines and debarment
from a profeSSion, do not
constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.
In so
holding, the Court abrogated its
previous holding in United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989),
in which civil fines of a certain
amount
were
considered
punishment enough to invoke a
finding of double jeopardy upon
prosecution.
Petitioners John Hudson,
Jack Rackley, and Larry Barasel
were contrOlling shareholders of
two Oklahoma Banks during the
1980's. An examination of the
bank by the Officer of the
Comptroller of Currency ("OCC")
revealed violations of several
banking statutes. The specific
violations pertained to third party
loans designed to aid Hudson in
a buyback of bank stock used as
collateral on defaulted loans.
The petitioners were served with
a "Notice of Assessment of
Money Damages" for violation of
12 U.S.C. §§ 84(a)(1) and
375(b) (1982) and 12 C.F.R. §§
31.2(b) and 215.4(b) (1986). A
fine of $100,000 was levied
against Hudson while Rackley
and Barasel were fined $50,000
each. Subsequently, the OCC
served each of the Petitioners
with a "Notice of Intention to
Base Further Participation,"
effectively barring them from
working in any banking institution
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in the future.
The OCC
proceedings
against
the
Petitioners were resolved with a
Stipulation and Consent Order
which reduced the assessments
levied and barred the Petitioners
against participation in their
profession.
Two
years
later,
the
Petitioners were indicted in the
United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma
on charges of conspiracy,
misapplication of bank funds and
making false bank entries. The
indictments focused on the same
transactions for which the
Petitioners were administratively
sanctioned. They then moved to
dismiss the charges as a
violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The motion was denied
by the district court. On appeal,
the court of appeals upheld the
ruling on the non-participation
sanction, but vacated the denial
on the monetary fine issue and
remanded to the district court.
The district court dismissed the
indictments,
which
the
govemment appealed.
The
court of appeals reversed,
applying the test of United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989),

in which fines were considered
double
"punishment"
for
jeopardy purposes when "grossly
disproportionate"
to
the
damages inflicted on the
government. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the double jeopardy
implications of Halper.
The
Court affirmed the finding of the
court of appeals but refused to
apply Halper.
The Court began its analysis
by reiterating that the bar against
double jeopardy prevents an
imposition of multiple criminal
punishments for the same
offense. Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at
493 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938)).
In
determining
whether
a
punishment will invoke a double
jeopardy violation, a court must
discern if a particular punishment
is classified as civil or criminal.
This will be "indicated either
expressly or impliedly" in the
statute.
Id. (quoting United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248 (1980)). The Court noted
that even in such cases where
the legislature's intent was to
impose a civil fine, the statutory
scheme must be examined to
determine if the punishment was
so severe as to "transform ... a
civil remedy into a criminal
punishment." Id. (quoting Rex
Trailer Co. v. U.S., 350 U.S. 148,
154 (1956)).
The Court cited several
factors
from
Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Marlinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963) that should be used to
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determine if a punishment is civil
or criminal. The factors include:
whether the sanction involves
"affirmative disability or restraint;
whether the sanction has been
historically
regarded
as
punishment; whether it comes
into play only after a finding of
scienter; whether it fits the
traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence; and
whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative
purpose assigned." Id. (quoting
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
The Court then reinforced that
the factors could only be applied
to the "statute on its face" and
that only the "clearest proof'
permitted overriding legislative
intent. Id. (quoting Ward, 448
U.S. at 249). Halper, the Court
opined, was decided without
applying the factors and, thus,
was an "ill-considered" deviation
from the traditional double
jeopardy analysis applied by the
Court. Id. at 494.
The traditional analysis, as
exemplified
in
Ward,
to
determine a bar based on
double
jeopardy
purposes
involves a two-step test. Id. The
court must first determine
whether the punishment is civil
or criminal, then whether the
successive
punishment
is
criminal. Id. The Court found
error in the Halper Court's
concentration on the Kennedy
factor of excessiveness of
punishment in relation to
damages inflicted and a failure to
consider the sanctions in relation
to the statute. Id. The result of
the error, according to the Court,
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was the creation of an
unworkable
standard
to
determine whether a sanction is
punitive. Id. The
Halper
standard proved especially
unworkable in cases such as the
case sub judice where criminal
proceedings
followed
civil
Id.
The Court
penalties.
reasoned that under Halper, "it
would not be possible to
determine whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause is violated until
a defendant has proceeded
through a trial to judgment." Id.
at 495.
The Court further
reinforced the need to abandon
Halper
by
noting
other
constitutional provisions protect
individuals from penalties such
as irrational sanctions and
excessive civil fines. Id.
Turning to case at hand, the
Court found that the fines and
debarment sanctions do not
violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause when using the traditional
analysis. Id. The Court cited
clear congreSSional intent to
penalties civil
make the
punishment. Id. First, the money
penalties are expressly classified
in 12 U.S.C. sections 93(b)(1)
and 504(a) as civil. Id. (citing 12
U.S.C. §§ 93(b)(1), 504(a)
(1982».
Second, while not
expressly stated as a civil
sanctions, the Court found the
referral
of
debarment
proceedings to the "appropriate
Federal banking agencies" to be
prima facie evidence that
Congress intended debarment to
be a civil sanction. Id.
Applying the second step of

acc

the Ward test, the Court found
that the sanctions could not
provide the "clearest proof' that
Congress intended the sanctions
to be criminal in nature. Id. The
penalties were not traditionally
viewed as punishment and
debarment is viewed as a
revocation of voluntarily granted
privilege, which is "free of the
punitive criminal element." Id. at
496 (quoting Helvering v.
Mitchell at 399). The Court
further found that the instant
case
further failed
upon
application of the Kennedy
factors,
most notably the
traditional goal of criminal
punishment as a deterrent. Id.
In previous holdings by the
Court, deterrence "serve[d] civil
as well as criminal goals." Id.
(quoting United States v. Usery,
116 S.Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996».
The holding in Hudson v.
United States was a necessary
return to the traditional double
jeopardy test applied in Ward.
The potential elimination of
criminal accountability based on
substantial civil penalties under
Halper produced many poor
results. The availability of a civil
deterrent is an important feature
in the regulatory scheme of
Holding
many agencies.
violators civilly and criminally
accountable for their actions
serves the greater good by
protecting industries as well as
individuals affected by the
criminal actions of defendants
such as those in Hudson.

